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and the note negotiable. In Minnesota, the higher rate is void because
of a statute; 2" however, the courts have not allowed that to interfere
with the negotiability of the instrument.2" In Miller v. Kyle,2" the Ohio
court held that although the stipulation for the payment of attorney fees
was void, the instrument was none the less negotiable. The third possi-
bility would be to say that the stipulation is valid and the note is nego-
t;able. As has been said, the great weight of authority considers this
type of interest provision as valid."r It is also true that the great weight
of authority holds that this type of interest provision does not destroy the
negotiability of the instrument.2" In National Life Insurance Co. v. Sil-
ver,21 the Oklahoma court held that such a provision was a valid contract
as long as it did not contravene the usuary law, and in Moore v. Inter-
state Mortgage Trust Co.," the same court held that the provision did
not destroy negotiability. F.A.R.
USURY - APPLICABILITY OF OHIO G.C. SEC. 6 34 6 -5A
TO CREDIT UNIONS
The plaintiff, a credit union organized under Ohio G.C. sec. 9676
et seq., sued on a note for the sum of $823.04, with interest at the rate
of one per cent per month on the unpaid balance. The defendant pleaded
in avoidance that the plaintiff was subject to Ohio G.C. sec. 6346-5a,
which provides that a licensee under the Small Loan Company Act' shall
not charge any interest on loans in excess of $300.00 at a rate greater
than eight per cent per annum, under penalty of forfeiture of the right
to collect either principal or interest. It was held that the note was void
as violating this statute.2
The decision was unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. In the
first place, there was no mention of the Credit Union Act,' by virtue of
which the plaintiff is engaged in the loan business. Section 9683 pro-
" Supra note 20.
'Investor's Syndicate v. Baskerville Bro's Holding Co., supra note 2o.
85 Ohio St. 186 (i911).
'Supra note I5.
z "The same rule is applied where a note bearing interest is to bear a higher rate
from maturity if not paid; such a promise in a note does not, according to the weight of
authority render it non-negotiable." 2 A.L.R. 140. See annotations in 2 A.L.R. 14o and
41 A.L.R. 294. In addition, see Burns Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Friedman, 292 U.S. 4 S7, 78
L. Ed. 138O, 54 Sup. Ct. 8I3 (1934).
265 Okla. 85, 163 Pac. 274 (1916).
172 Okla. 471, 45 P. (zd) 485 (193)-
'Ohio G.C., sec. 6346-1 et seq.
Columbus Postal Employees Credit Union, Inc. v. Mitchell, 6z Ohio App. 343,
23 N.E. (zd) 989 (1939).
' Ohio G.C., see. 9676 ct seq.
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vides: "... The interest on any loan made by a credit union shall not
exceed one per cent (I %) per month on unpaid balances . . ." It was
under this authority that the loan in question was made. This fact was
not properly pleaded, and the failure of the court to consider the possi-
bility that the plaintiff was a credit union is therefore excusable. But the
court's failure to do so and to exclude credit unions from the operation
of sec. 6346-5a leaves the definite impression that, whether a credit
union or not, the plaintiff was subject to its penalty. Furthermore, there
was no specific showing of the fact that the plaintiff was a chattel loan
company and subject to the provisions of the Small Loan Company Act,
if it were not acredit union.
Fortunately, a better disposition of these questions was made on re-
hearing, in which the court reversed itself,4 holding that since the plain-
tiff failed to allege and prove its existence as a credit union, it was not
entitled to charge the interest rate permitted by the Credit Union Act,
and that since the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff was a
chattel loan company, sec. 6346-5a was not applicable. The Court
then held that the interest charged was usurious and void, and permitted
recovery of the principal and six per cent interest.'
This holding substantially negatives the inference resulting from the
previous decision that credit unions are subject to the provisions of sec.
6346-5a, by the implication that had the plaintiff shown its organization
under the Credit Union Act it would be entitled to charge the one
per cent per month permitted by that act. It is submitted that this is a
reasonable interpretation of the effect of the Credit Union Act. The two
acts constitute separate chapters of the Code, the Small Loan Company
Act considerably antedating the Credit Union Act.' Since the latter
contains no reference to the Small Loan Company Act, it seems prob-
able that the Legislature intended credit unions to be immune from its
operation. J.R.E.
'Columbus Postal Employees Credit Union, Inc. v. Mitchell, - Ohio App. - (594o).
5 It is well settled in Ohio that the creditor on a note containing a provision for an
usurious rate of interest is remitted to the "legal rate" of six per cent on the amount of
his loan. McClelland v. Sorter, 39 Ohio St. iz (1883); Insurance Company v. Carpenter,
40 Ohio St. z6o (1883).
'The Credit Union Act, sec. 9676 et seq., is effective from August I, 1931, while
the Small Loan Company Act became effective June 7, 1911 -
